A Changing Federal-State Balance in Unemployment Insurance?
Unempl oyment insurance (UI) provides temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily jobless workers who are strongly attached to the labor force. The federal-state UI system was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 during the Great Depression. Despite the severity of the long-term unemployment problem at the time, the UI program started modestly. The original aims were to alleviate hardship during temporary periods of joblessness, maintain aggregate purchasing power during economic downturns, preserve employer-employee relationships, and prevent descent into poverty. States' reluctance to establish programs was overcome by the incentive of a federal tax with a 90 percent credit to states operating conforming UI programs. Through its benefi t and fi nancing mechanisms, UI is an automatic stabilizer for the economy. In recessions spending is injected through benefi ts, and benefi t disbursements decline in recoveries. Through the forward funding principle, states accumulate reserves during economic expansions and draw them down during recessions. The UI program has served well its core aims over the years, but the federal-state balance of responsibilities is changing, and current trends in funding and benefi t duration threaten the countercyclical strength of state programs. Yang, Lasky, and Page (2010) of the Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO) rated UI as the best of 11 possible countercyclical policy measures because of its timeliness, strength, and temporary nature. Besides replacing lost earnings to households, they estimate UI job creation strength to be between two and fi ve times that of infrastructure spending. During the recent Great Recession, UI was particularly important in alleviating hardship and serving as a countercyclical mechanism. Acs and Dahl (2010, p. 8) of the CBO estimated that "in 2009, the poverty rate was 14.3 percent. Without UI benefi ts, it would have been 15.4 percent."
In 2009 states paid $79 billion in regular UI benefi ts, while the federal government provided $49.2 billion in emergency and extended benefi ts. The federal support included the full $6.1 billion cost of benefi ts paid through the permanent federal-state extended benefi ts program that is normally fi nanced 50-50 together with the states. Despite federal largess, the Great Recession exhausted the majority of state accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund. Many states had not accumulated adequate reserves before the downturn and were forced to borrow from the Federal Unemployment Account. Figure 1 shows the federal shares of total UI benefi t payments in years around recessions dating back to 1958. The federal shares in the past three years were enormous, reaching 55.7 percent in 2011.
The UI system was designed to be self-fi nancing and started with a strong fi nancial foundation having relatively high tax rates and modest benefi ts. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) in 1939 set the total tax rate at 3 percent on the fi rst $3,000 earned by each employee-the same as Social Security at the time. A 90 percent FUTA credit meant a tax rate of 2.7 percent paid into state reserve accounts for benefi ts, with 0.3 percent paid into federal accounts for program administration, loan reserves, and employment services. In 1939, most states paid weekly benefi ts equal to half the weekly wage up to a maximum of $15 for up to 16 weeks. Some offered as many as 26 weeks (Table 1) . It was common at that time for states to require waiting periods between 2 and 4 weeks as a type of insurance copayment covered by the worker.
After World War II, reserves accumulated and benefi ts improved. Suffi cient forward funding of benefi ts permitted development of state fi nancing systems that recovered charges three to fi ve years after payment when the economy was again in the expansion phase. By the late 1950s nearly all states provided up to 26 weeks of compensation. In 1959, one waiting week was standard in all but fi ve states. In the 1960s, system reserves continued to rise and 26 weeks became the minimum potential compensable duration in all states.
As social insurance, UI does not replace all lost wages. Instead, wage replacement aims to cover most nondeferrable expenses for a median household. Various strands of research all fi nd the optimal replacement rate at about 50 percent of lost wages. That rate is said to balance socially adequate income replacement against possible work disincentives. Research also suggests that the common practice of a fi xed weekly benefi t amount for up to 26 weeks during joblessness would tend to overcompensate short spells and undercompensate long spells of unemployment (O'Leary 1998). Recessions starting after the fi rst OPEC oil embargo in 1973 put a severe strain on state UI fi nancing systems. Actions and inactions by the state and federal partners in response to successive crises over the years have tipped the balance toward a larger federal role in the system.
To earn their FUTA credit, states are required to experience rate taxes paid by employers based on their UI benefi t charges, and to have taxable wage bases at least as high as the FUTA level. The FUTA tax base has been increased only three times: to $4,200 in 1972, to $6,000 in 1978, and to the current level of $7,000 in 1983 by President Reagan. That current level is only 6.2 percent of the $113,700 taxable wage base for Social Security. Since many states set their maximum taxable wage base at or near the FUTA level, the average tax on total payrolls has declined dramatically, and states often strain to cover ineffective charges to employers perpetually stuck at the maximum tax rate. Such employers have benefi t charges exceeding contributions every year, and are subsidized by employers whose taxes vary within the limits of the tax rate range. Thirty-fi ve states currently have UI taxable wage bases at or below $15,000.
The recessions of 1975, 1980, and 1982 resulted in signifi cant levels of borrowing by states to pay UI benefi ts, and the share of unemployed receiving UI continued a downward trend through the early 1980s. Federal actions to raise triggers for the extended benefi ts, and state actions to tighten eligibility requirements and enforce active job search all curtailed recipiency. After the industrial restructuring and massive permanent worker displacements in the (Vroman 2011) . These actions were probably infl uenced by the federal benefi ts extension for 2011 that prohibited reductions in weekly benefi ts but did not address durations. It has been more than 60 years since potential durations have been less than 26 weeks in any state. In 2012, Georgia implemented a system with maximum potential duration up to 20 weeks if unemployment is 9.0 percent or higher, with the maximum falling by 1 week for each 0.5 percentage point drop in the state total unemployment rate reaching a minimum of 14 weeks if unemployment is 6.5 percent or lower.
Preliminary data from a proposed federal Employment and Training Administration report on the actual quarterly distributions of UI benefi t receipt are used to shed light on the effects of shorter potential durations. In a representative state, with variable entitled duration, an average of 43.0 percent of benefi ciaries exhausted the 26-week maximum entitlements between 2006 and 2011. Each of the benefi t durations between 25 and 10 weeks were experienced by 3-4 percent of the benefi ciaries, and a total of 1 percent had durations less than 10 weeks. Using an econometric benefi t fi nancing model, we simulated the effect on total UI payments under the assumption that state unemployment gradually declines from 9.5 percent in 2012 to 5.8 percent in 2021. Adopting the declining maximum duration feature alone, annual UI benefi t payments will be 39 percent lower in 2021. We also simulated the effect of this change together with two others: 1) fi xing the maximum weekly benefi t amount at 70 percent of its current dollar level; and 2) changing the benefi t formula from being based on the high quarter only to the two most recent quarters-which includes the Ashenfelter income dip for displaced workers. This second bundle of changes is simulated to produce UI benefi t payments 67 percent lower in 2021 than would result under the current system (Figure 2 ). Such packages of benefi t changes dramatically reduce the alleviation of hardship caused by unemployment, and seriously weaken the countercyclical strength of UI benefi ts.
The UI system served an important stabilizing function for the economy during the recent deep and protracted recession. However, federal action and state responses to accumulated debt threaten the countercyclical strength of the federal-state system. Reforms proposed by the White House and the Senate to raise the FUTA wage limit to $15,000 would broaden the tax base in the majority of states and should improve forward funding of the system. A House proposal to federally pay about $31 billion in state debts would reinforce current trends of declining state fi scal preparedness. Rather than focusing mainly on reduced benefi t provisions to address fi scal diffi culties, states should adopt balanced packages of revenue and benefi t reforms. In addition to raising the FUTA tax base, the federal partner should institute minimum standards on weekly benefi t levels and durations, and also tie potential durations of any future federal emergency benefi ts to the existing state maximum durations. For example, a state providing up to 26 weeks would get 13 weeks of federal temporary benefi ts, but if the state maximum were 20 weeks the federal supplement would be 10 weeks. A much neglected potential reform on the benefi t side would be to institute waiting periods of 2-4 weeks, with the duration of the wait depending inversely on the aggregate level of unemployment. Current UI take-up rates among the eligible unemployed range from 60 to 80 percent depending on job market conditions. A somewhat longer waiting period will reduce program entry by those with ready reemployment options, and help to preserve the income security strength of the system for those who are involuntarily jobless for 4, 5, or 6 months. This approach could help preserve benefi t adequacy while fi scal reforms broaden the tax base and range of rates to restore the experience rating principle. Better cost recovery of benefi t charges will assure that fi nal prices of goods and services more properly refl ect the full cost of unemployment risk in their production.
